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We present a model that suggests possible explanations for the observed proliferation of “pay-per-use”
(PPU) business models over the last two decades. Delivering “fractions” of a product as a service offers a
cost advantage to customers with lower usage but requires extra delivery costs. Previous research focused
on information goods (with negligible production costs) and predicted that PPU, when arising as a differen-
tiation to selling in equilibrium, fundamentally achieves lower profits than selling. We extend the theory by
covering goods with any production cost, in duopolistic competition. We show that PPU business models
can be more profitable than selling (especially at mid-range production costs), as long as their delivery costs
are not too high, a requirement that is more easily fulfilled as new technologies reduce these costs. Moreover,
if firms are imperfectly informed about their customers’ usage profiles, PPU’s effective pricing of customers’
varying usage offers an additional advantage over selling. This requires companies to employ accounting
methods that do not inappropriately allocate production costs over stochastic usage levels. If PPU service
provision suffers from queueing inefficiencies, this does not fundamentally change the relative profitability
of the PPU and selling models, provided that PPU providers can attract sufficiently high demand to benefit
from pooling economies.
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1. Introduction
Companies compete not only with the quality and price of their products and services but also
with their business models. A business model is defined by the content, structure, and governance
of transactions (Amit and Zott 2001, Zott and Amit 2007). It describes how firms carry out their
economic activity, “the way they do business.” Most prominently, this is captured by the profit
model, which describes the pricing mechanism in the economic exchange with customers (Cachon
2018, Christensen et al. 2016, Gassmann et al. 2014). In addition to innovations in products and
services, business model innovations have attracted much managerial attention in the last decade
(Girotra and Netessine 2011, Christensen et al. 2016). Pricing mechanisms offer one differentiation
route to lower competition intensity; for example, profit models have exhibited a shift away from
1
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product selling toward the selling of product usage, referred to as “Pay-Per-Use (PPU).”1 Charging
a customer a price per “usage” has, of course, existed for a long time: for example, Xerox has
rented copiers to corporate clients, who pay a price per copy made, since the 1970s (Chesbrough
and Rosenbloom 2002), and Rolls Royce pioneered the aircraft engine as a service, paid per hour
of aircraft flight (Kim et al. 2007). These examples are not outliers despite the fact that a PPU
service may sometimes carry sizeable usage-related delivery costs such as monitoring, tracking, or
billing.
The starting point of our study is that PPU models have become much more widespread over
the last decade; see, for example, Signify’s selling of lighting instead of light bulbs (Lorenzo and
Sánchez 2007), or Hilti’s construction solutions instead of power tools (Johnson 2010). Today, com-
panies are offering usage-based pricing on everything from cars to car insurance, software, hardware
infrastructure, music and films, as well as machinery and industrial products. The question that
our study examines is why this is the case.
Previous academic literature has proposed that PPU business models may arise as differentiation
mechanisms in competitive equilibria, in “information goods” with zero production costs. Although
they may produce positive profits, PPU models are shown to be less profitable than selling (Bala
and Carr 2010, Balasubramanian et al. 2015). These findings imply that PPU models should not be
sought as a priority by companies. Therefore, the existing literature does not offer an explanation
of the recent proliferation of PPU pricing mechanisms across many industries.
One possible explanation for this proliferation may relate to the costs of offering a PPU model.
Companies nowadays can offer PPU mechanisms because technology lowers the delivery costs
required. Technological advances, such as ubiquitous sensors, Internet speed, and cloud computing,
facilitate the tracking, billing, and, in some cases, delivery of smaller and more dynamic increments
of use across a variety of customer contexts (Kavadias et al. 2016). Moreover, it seems that some
consumer segments (for example, “millennials”) prefer paying small increments for a usage unit,
rather than paying for the whole product (Kotler 2011). However, reduced PPU delivery costs
alone cannot explain a proliferation of PPU business models, as the same technologies that reduce
logistics costs may also reduce the distribution costs for the seller, and, again render selling more
attractive than PPU, as the information goods literature predicts.
This leads to the research question of our study: Is there an explanation, beyond differentiation,
for the wide adoption of PPU business models across industries (many with non-zero production
costs)? In other words, under what cost conditions can a PPU business model be more profitable
than a selling model in a competitive equilibrium?
1 This shift has been given different names in different industries, such as servicization (Kim et al. 2007, Agrawal and
Bellos 2016, Örsdemir et al. 2018) or product-as-a-service, to name a few.
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In order to answer this question, we develop a normative model that compares the profitability
of a PPU and a selling business model in a competitive duopoly. PPU models require, at a min-
imum, some consumers who benefit from the fractional use of an asset (whether or not they are
heterogeneous in their asset use). We explicitly account for the manufacturing costs and delivery
costs of monitoring and managing consumer usage faced by PPU business models. It turns out
that manufactured goods markets behave very differently than information goods markets, a fact
that previous studies have not considered. For manufactured goods, being able to use the product
without owning it is valuable to customers and can make the PPU model more profitable than
selling.
We examine the PPU model’s profitability relative to the selling model across a variety of
industrial settings, namely:
1. when consumers are heterogeneous both in their usage and in valuation,
2. when consumers are sensitive to pricing and endogenously decide on their usage quantity,
3. when consumers’ usage is not uniformly distributed,
4. when there is uncertainty in the usage quantities,
5. when the “level of service” (represented by product availability) and queuing effects are
accounted for.
1.1. Literature Review
Whereas the literature on the competitiveness of different business models has been primarily
qualitative (Christensen et al. 2016, Girotra and Netessine 2011, Gassmann et al. 2014), economists
have approached business models through the analysis of key variables that drive profitability, for
example, quality, quantity, and price. A large and influential body of literature has addressed this
topic through product quality and market differentiation (Maskin and Riley 1984, Moorthy 1988,
Mussa and Rosen 1978, Wilson 1993). Only a small amount of sub-literature has addressed PPU
pricing, and it has largely focused on information goods, where manufacturing costs are zero or
negligibly small.
In this literature, three notable studies are closely related to our work: first, Varian (2000) asks
whether usage-based pricing of an information good can actually make a monopolist better off.
He answers positively under certain circumstances: when sharing the good is cheap; when the
informational content is viewed only a limited number of times, so that buying is “inefficient”;
and when sharing allows market segmentation. Second, Sundararajan (2004) shows that between
two pricing schemes (fixed fee and usage-based pricing) a monopolist’s optimal pricing model is
mixed, including a fixed fee plus a usage-based fee. Finally, Balasubramanian et al. (2015) consider
a competitive duopoly where one firm sells information goods (software) and the other offers a
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PPU version of the software package. Users differ in their usage quantity, and they face a psy-
chological disutility from PPU (the stressful “ticking-meter” effect). In this duopoly equilibrium,
selling earns higher profits than PPU — PPU is a fundamentally less profitable business model in
the presence of competition. Our model adds to this literature by introducing non-zero production
costs. This was previously dismissed with the argument that production costs are fixed and sunk
and thus not decision-relevant (Balasubramanian et al. 2015, p.222). However, production costs are
almost always apportioned and thus “made variable” in PPU markets. We retain several appro-
priate characteristics from the information goods models: like Varian (2000), the product can be
efficiently shared by low-usage customers; we model consumer usage as in Balasubramanian et al.
(2015), and we consider duopolistic competition as they do. A special case of our model with zero
production costs is consistent with their findings. However, the presence of even small production
costs fundamentally changes the competitive dynamics.
Another related literature is concerned with two-part tariffs, the variable component of which rep-
resents usage-based pricing. This literature has also focused largely on information goods. Essegaier
et al. (2002) examine information goods both in a monopoly and a duopoly, and they find that
two-part pricing might not be optimal compared to a pure selling business model. Fishburn and
Odlyzko (1999) examine two service providers that use different business models, namely, a fixed
fee and PPU, in a multi-period repeated game. They also find that the selling firm (fixed subscrip-
tion fee) performs better than the PPU firm. Closer to our work, a few studies have examined
manufactured goods with a non-zero unit cost. In two seminal studies, Bulow (1982) and Stokey
(1981) examine a durable goods monopolist’s choice between the business models of product selling
and product leasing (which is similar but not the same as usage-based pricing because payments
are by period rather than by usage). In a two-period model, they show that the selling business
model does not do as well as the leasing model. Hayes (1987) examines perfect competition, where
producers price at marginal cost, and finds that a two-part tariff scheme might be preferred over
fixed pricing if the consumers are uncertain about their consumption levels. Consumers choose
PPU as a “hedge” against a scenario where they consume very little and would overpay if they
bought the “whole” product. Finally, Desai and Purohit (1999) examine competition in durable
goods markets, where firms compete in a two-period game by selling and leasing a percentage of
their products. The more intense the competition, the lower the percentage of leasing. There is
also a stream of literature on durable goods with c > 0 that examines whether servicization is
greener than selling (Agrawal et al. 2012, Agrawal and Bellos 2016, Örsdemir et al. 2018). These
models are based on multi-period games and examine profitability as well as the effects of selling
and servicization on the environment, but they are all restricted to monopolies.
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1.2. Main Results and Contribution
Our study extends this literature along three dimensions: first, we explicitly consider the usage
quantity (the number of uses), as opposed to time-based leasing contracts. Second, we generalize
previous studies by considering arbitrary production costs and their allocation across the different
uses – information goods with zero production costs are a special case of our model. Third, we
focus on competition between two firms (which may employ different business models). To our
knowledge, previous work has not addressed this combination, although it represents a large fraction
of industrial settings.
As in previous studies, the differentiating feature of PPU over product selling lies in its ability
to serve consumers with low usage quantities (for whom buying a “whole” product would be
inefficient). Our base model suggests that a monopolist prefers the PPU business model to product
selling when the usage delivery cost is below a threshold fraction of the unit production cost
(consistent with Varian (2000)). In a competitive duopoly equilibrium, the PPU business model is
more profitable when the delivery cost is lower than a threshold that depends on the production
cost, with the threshold at its highest at medium production costs. For very cheap products, PPU
is not worthwhile, as the full product satisfies all customers effectively at very low prices; for very
expensive products, the amortized part of the unit production cost becomes too high relative to
the consumer willingness to pay for a single use, which together with the additional delivery cost
squeezes the potential for a profit margin.
The finding that PPU is more profitable for a significant range of (production cost, delivery
cost) instances is a fundamental deviation from previous literature. Our model predicts that if
changes in both types of cost have moved a set of competitors within an industrial setting into the
appropriate region of the cost space, PPU can become more profitable than selling. For example,
the evolution of technology could reduce both delivery costs (e.g., tracking) and production costs
(e.g., materials, automation). Overall, one can expect that under certain industry settings PPU
would be adopted more widely by companies. This area of competition between PPU and selling,
with the effects of the configuration of both production and delivery costs, is not intuitive and has
not been shown. Thus, our model suggests a possible explanation of the observed increase in the
use of PPU models.
Extensions of the model confirm the wide applicability of our results. We first consider cus-
tomers who vary not only in their usage quantity but also in their valuation of a single usage.
Our qualitative findings continue to hold; there are regions in the (production cost, delivery cost)
space in which PPU is more profitable than selling and the threshold value of the delivery cost is
non-monotone. The same continues to hold when users are heterogeneous, both in usage and in
valuation, and are price-sensitive (they choose usage endogenously).
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If customers are not only heterogeneous but also uncertain in their usage frequency, or if the
maximum number of uses a product can support is uncertain, the PPU business model becomes
even more attractive (it wins over selling at higher levels of delivery costs). This happens because
a customer under PPU naturally purchases individual uses without explicit concerns about the
maximum number of uses, so the PPU provider is isolated from the usage uncertainty and gains
market share from the seller, who must hedge against the usage uncertainty. This depends, however,
on the capability of the service provider to make pricing and capacity decisions not based on
allocating the production cost over the (a priori stochastic) realized number of uses but instead over
the expected number of uses (standard costing). Straight allocation based on the realized number of
uses makes the per-use cost uncertain, which forces the PPU provider to hedge as well, neutralizing
its natural flexibility-based competitive advantage over the seller. We show that allocation of the
production cost over the expected number of uses (standard costing) allows the PPU provider to
employ the number of assets required to match expected supply with demand.
Finally, we examine PPU inefficiencies arising from impatient customers having to queue for the
service. PPU providers need to deploy excess capacity, which is linked to the service level they
opt to offer. Although the PPU model becomes relatively less attractive, the delay disadvantage of
the PPU model diminishes with economies of scale and, moreover, customer impatience may also
be characterized by heterogeneity, which enables the PPU provider to discriminate on customer
service delays and improve its market share and profitability.
1.3. Organization of the Paper
In Section 2, we present the key assumptions and the mathematical set-up of the base model,
for which Section 3 describes the results. Then, we explore three extensions: Section 4 illustrates
the robustness of the base case results in the presence of customers that are heterogeneous in
both usage valuations (willingness to pay) and usage needs; it also explores a different model, in
which heterogeneous consumers in valuation choose their usage quantities endogenously. Section
5 examines the effects of uncertainty in the usage level distributions, whereas Section 6 addresses
PPU inefficiencies arising from queuing effects. Section 7 draws conclusions and outlines future
work.
2. Model Set-up
Our base model consists of the following elements: the firms’ production structure, the market
structure with the associated consumer utilities, and the two business models. In the selling business
model, upfront payment gives the consumer ownership and unrestricted use of a product. In the
PPU business model, the customer pays (usually ex post) for use of the product. The PPU model
Ladas, Kavadias, and Loch: Product Selling versus Pay-per-Use Service
7
carries an extra delivery/logistics2 cost per use. Firms can choose either the PPU or the selling
business models. We compare the optimum profitability of the two business models in monopoly,
and we analyze the duopoly equilibrium business model choices for all admissible values of the
production and delivery costs.
2.1. Production Structure
Firms incur a constant unit production cost, c > 0 for producing or sourcing the product. The
product is a physical or digital entity that enables multiple uses (e.g., multiple car trips undertaken
by the owner). Consumers may also be given the option of buying a single use (e.g., a single car trip)
without becoming product owners. Each product, as an individual asset, can deliver a maximum
of qm uses before becoming obsolete.
3
PPU providers also incur a delivery or logistics cost per use, δ. It includes all expenses that a
service provider incurs to offer the PPU service, for example, monitoring and billing of usage (as
in the case of telecommunications providers who offer pay-as-you-go plans), or maintenance, or
insurance costs (as in the case of car rental services and power-by-the-hour services for jet engines),
or even coordination costs (as in the case of shared car service schemes where firms need to schedule,
plan, and manage a distributed fleet of shared cars). The logistics cost can also result from service
design decisions to “give away” some value to build market share. For example, Zipcar started by
offering a Honda Civic for $8.50 per hour including 25 free miles (Frei 2005). Estimating the car’s
gasoline mileage at 35 mpg and the price of a gallon of fuel at $2.80, the free mileage decision
amounted to adding $2 (=2.80*25/35) on top of other logistics costs for offering the service.
2.2. Market Structure
All customers have (for now) the same valuation, or willingness to pay (WTP), a, for a single
use of the product, but they differ in their desired usage quantity, q, the number of uses over the
product’s useful life, which is the time horizon of our model. We assume that q ∈ [0, qm], where
qm is the maximum meaningful number of uses that the product can deliver. We assume that
customers’ desired usage quantity, q, is uniformly distributed over the range [0, qm], with density
function f(q) = 1/qm.
2 In the remainder of the paper, we will interchangeably use the terms logistics costs and delivery costs.
3 The quantity qm does not necessarily reflect the technological limit of the particular product but instead the
maximum meaningful use over the product’s lifetime. For operational or marketing reasons, the marketable lifetime
of a product is usually less than its technological lifetime. For example, car rental companies use rental cars for a
set number of years (typically 1–2 years) although a car can last much longer.We have explicitly assumed that uses
and time are related in our model. It is indeed true that in reality units of the same product would deliver different
maximum numbers of uses within a period of time. However, as a first order analysis we consider that every product
unit delivers the same amount qm within a time period. We relax the fixed nature of obsolescence qm in Section 5,
where we treat the parameter qm as stochastic.
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Customer utilities associated with the different business models are as follows: Us(q;ps) = qa−ps
is the utility of a customer with usage quantity q who purchases the product at a price, ps, and
Uu(q;pu) = q(a−pu) is the utility of a customer with usage quantity q who uses the product under
a PPU scheme with price pu per use. Note that both business models deliver the same gross utility,
qa, but differ in the net utility provided, once prices are applied.
2.3. Business Models
We examine first the profit structure of the selling and the pay-per-use business models. The selling





where the domain of integration D is D = {q | Us(q) > 0} in monopoly and D = {q | Us(q) >
0 and Us(q) > Uu(q)} in duopoly. A PPU service provider (either in monopoly or duopoly) buys
a number of assets (products), say N , from manufacturers at cost c, pools the total customers’
usage, and offers a service charging pu per use, incurring a logistic cost, δ, per use . The expected





where the domain of integration D = {q | Uu(q) > 0} in monopoly and D = {q | Uu(q) >
0 and Uu(q)>Us(q)} in duopoly.
In allocating the production cost to the uses, we are assuming that the PPU firm operates
in a strong pooling regime, as described in Agrawal and Bellos (2016). Strong pooling has two
elements. First, an asset, even if purchased or produced at the outset, does not have its production
cost sunk; rather, production costs can be allocated to uses. This assumption is appropriate for a
strategic analysis: for example, car rental companies lease the cars, as do airline companies with
their airplanes. Moreover, part of these costs can often be recovered if the assets are not used to
their end of life. For example, many consumer goods are re-manufactured, or traded in secondary
markets. Therefore, asset costs are almost universally allocated to uses.
Second, strong pooling makes an operational assumption, namely that the PPU provider is able
to use exactly the number of assets required to fulfill demand at 100% utilization: If one asset can
deliver qm uses and the demand is not overlapping, then the number of products the PPU provider
has to buy is N =
∫
D
qf(q)dq/qm. For non-overlapping demand, even when the PPU provider cannot
exactly match supply with demand and ends up with some unused capacity the strong pooling
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assumption offers a good approximation of the per use cost when the demand is high.4 In Section 6
we relax this strong pooling assumption by accounting for the queueing inefficiencies arising from
overlapping customer demand, which require the PPU provider to hold excess capacity to achieve
targeted service levels.









where, cu, is the cost per-use, cu = c/qm+ δ, and includes the logistics cost, δ, of delivering a single
use plus the amortized unit production cost spread over the maximum number of uses. Profits are
positive for both models if c6 aqm and cu 6 a: the production cost must be below the maximum
value that customers obtain by purchasing the product, and the fully loaded cost per use must be
smaller than the customer’s benefit from that use.






In the duopoly setting, each firm i maximizes its profit subject to the competitive choice of the











In line with previous literature, we assume that firms first simultaneously choose their business
model, s or u, and then, knowing the business model choices, simultaneously choose prices. Our
sequential timeline reflects the mere reality that business model choices imply irreversible invest-
ments (e.g., setting up a usage monitoring and/or a billing system) and therefore precede the price
decisions.
2.4. Base Model Assumptions
Our base model is parsimonious, and it rests upon a few key assumptions. With respect to the
demand, we assume that the willingness to pay for a single use is constant and common across
both business models. With respect to the supply, we assume that the PPU provider can apply
4 To see this, consider an asset that can deliver qm = 10 uses and costs $1. The per-use cost under strong pooling is
c/qm = 0.10. When a PPU firm faces a low demand, say 12 units, the firm has to use 2 assets to meet this demand.
Then, the per-use cost is 2/12 = $0.1667, which is 67% higher than the strong pooling equivalent cost. This is because
the fraction of unused product capacity is significant. However, when the firm faces a high demand, say 402 units,
then it has to use 41 assets to meet that demand. In this case, the per-use cost is 41/402 = $0.1019, or 2% higher
than the strong pooling equivalent.
Ladas, Kavadias, and Loch: Product Selling versus Pay-per-Use Service
10
strong pooling (exact match of demand with supply and full asset utilization). Finally, we assume
that the providers know upfront the deterministic maximum useful lifetime of an asset.
In the next section we analyze the duopoly equilibrium choices for our base model, and we
further discuss the relative profitability of the two business models in the case of asymmetric
duopoly equilibria. Then, in the subsequent sections we relax these key assumptions in order to see
their effect on the relative profitability of the selling and the PPU models. We enrich the demand
structure in two distinct ways. First, in Section 4.1 we allow for the WTP apart from the usage
needs to vary independently. Thus, we cater for customers with continuously varying (lower or
higher) valuation and large or small usage needs. Second, in Section 4.2 we allow for an endogenous
emergence of the customer usage needs based on their variable willingness to pay (WTP) and the
price charged. We also relax the assumption that the consumer needs are uniformly distributed
in Section 4.3. Furthermore, in Section 6 we allow for the WTP to differ across the two business
models: we account for impatient customers who experience reduced value because they have to
wait for the service. The PPU provider needs to trade off more assets (overcapacity) for better
customer service delivery. Finally, in Section 5 we explore the effect of variability in the asset’s
useful lifetime on the relative profitability of the business models.
3. PPU Versus Selling: Base Model Analysis
We examine first the monopoly problem and identify when a monopolist should choose the service
model (PPU) or the selling model. Next, we examine the duopoly case, where we establish the
competitive game equilibrium and compare the profits of PPU and selling model for all admissible
values of production cost c and logistics cost δ.
3.1. The Monopolist’s Business Model Choice
Apart from serving as a useful benchmark, the monopolist’s optimal choice also allows us to
understand the key profit enablers across the two business models. The monopolist’s optimal prices,
p∗i , and profits, Π
∗
i (pi), for i= s,u are derived in Appendix A.1.1.
The PPU service model covers the entire market and extracts all consumer surplus at the expense
of the logistics costs. The selling model, in contrast, faces a lower limit in market coverage, which
has been observed previously in the vertical differentiation literature (Lancaster 1998). Customers
with usage needs above the limit are considering buying. Proposition (1) characterizes the optimal
business model choice.















s). The threshold value is δ̄(c) = (a
2q2m− c2)/2aq2m, and it
decreases concavely in c.
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Figure 1 Base model monopoly: areas in the (c, δ) space where one model is more profitable than the other. Yellow area:
PPU model more profitable, Light blue area: Selling model more profitable, Dark Blue area: PPU model not feasible.
The proof is shown in Appendix A.1.2. The iso-profit line in the (c, δ) space can be expressed
both by the relationship c̄(δ) = qm
√
a(a− 2δ) and by its inverse relationship, δ̄(c) = (a2q2m− c2)/2aq2m,
which gives a δ̄ threshold as a function of the unit production cost c. Figure 1 shows the areas




+ δ > a, the PPU business model is infeasible, as the service provider faces a higher cost
per use than the willingness to pay.
It is not surprising that the PPU model is a better choice for relatively lower service delivery
costs, whereas delivery costs above a certain threshold make product selling more profitable. What
is less intuitive is that the δ̄(c) threshold shrinks in c, which means that the service model becomes
less attractive for higher levels of production costs. To explain this, recall that the PPU monopolist
covers the entire market. As the production cost increases, the PPU profit decreases linearly in c,
whereas the seller’s profit decreases quadratically, resulting in the observed threshold.
3.2. Equilibria of the Business Model Choice Game
In this subsection we analyze the duopoly game, in which each firm chooses a business model,
and then based on their choice they set their competing prices. We establish the game’s sub-game
perfect equilibria, as well as the overall equilibrium. Each firm can use either or both business
models. We assume (for now) that the firms offer identical goods and there is no market friction.
This allows us to focus on the competition between the business models. The pure-strategy and
mixed-strategy equilibria for the overall game are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Base model equilibrium analysis
(i) There are two asymmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibria in the game, where the two firms
offer different business models.
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(ii) There are two symmetric sub-game perfect equilibria, in which both firms sell or both offer a
PPU service. In these equilibria, price competition reduces the firms’ profits to zero. These
sub-game perfect equilibria are not an overall game equilibrium.
(iii) There is also a unique symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, where each firm chooses
the selling business model with probability λs = Πs/(Πs + Πu) and the PPU business model
with probability λu = Πu/(Πs+Πu); where Πs is the resulting profit of a firm using the selling
mechanism under a pure-strategy asymmetric Nash equilibrium, and Πu, is the respective
profit of offering a PPU service.
The proof of this proposition is in Appendix A.2.2. The symmetric equilibria leave the firms
without profits, and the mixed-strategy equilibria do not capture the fact that firms make choices
with significant profit implications. Therefore, the two game equilibria that are relevant for a
managerial discussion are the two asymmetric pure-strategy equilibria, where one firm sells and the
other offers a PPU scheme. Which exact equilibrium arises depends on many factors outside the
scope of this work. In reality, even in the absence of an explicit coordination mechanism that guides
the firms’ business model choices, firms tend to choose different business models to differentiate
their offerings. Thus, coordination may be achieved in the long run as firms learn from their
coordination failures in the short run. One mechanism that may enable such coordination is “cheap
talk” (Farrell 1987, 1995). Cooper et al. (1989) report experimental results in the battle-of-the-sexes
game via cheap talk, and Crawford (1998) offers a survey of relevant experiments.
One might be tempted to suspect that the asymmetric equilibrium arises only when the goods
offered are identical (perfect substitution) and the market has no friction. Indeed, many consumer
markets exhibit some degree of price dispersion because market imperfections influence competi-
tion. Market imperfections may have many sources: different inventory costs between firms, cyclical
fluctuations in costs or demand, or customers’ search costs in seeking price information; other
sources are summarized in Stiglitz (1979). We show in Appendix A.2.3 that even in imperfect
markets, the asymmetric equilibria still arise for reasonable levels of market imperfection.5 This
suggests that the asymmetric competitive business model choice that we observe is not an arti-
fact of the perfect substitution assumption but rather reflective of the structure of competitive
duopolies.
5 We follow a model of price dispersion proposed by Varian (1980), in which market imperfection stems from the
coexistence of informed and uninformed customers in the market. Similar models have been developed by Salop and
Stiglitz (1977) and Shilony (1977).
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3.3. Comparison of Asymmetric Equilibrium Profits
Having established that asymmetric equilibria with differentiated business models are the key
constellations of the duopoly game, we now compare the equilibrium profits. The optimal prices,
p∗i , and profits, Π
∗
i (pi), for i= s,u depend on the production cost, c, and the delivery cost, δ, and
are given in the following table. The proof is in Appendix A.2.1.
06 2( c
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Competition between business models reveals three interesting structural properties of the strate-
gic interaction between the two firms. First, the two business models segment the market in the
following way: customers with high usage needs prefer the selling model, and customers with low
usage needs opt to be served by the PPU model.
Second, two pricing regimes emerge with different competitive pricing choices, depending on
the production cost. At low production costs, the PPU provider prices at twice the per-use cost,
choosing to keep a constant profit margin (pu− cu)/pu at 50%. Increases in production cost push
the service price, pu, closer to the customer’s willingness to pay for a single use, and a threshold
is reached, forcing the PPU provider to price at p∗u = a; recall that this is the monopoly price
of the PPU provider. In the second regime the PPU’s profit margin is decreasing in production
cost c. In both regimes the PPU provider increases their market share in number of uses, namely,
(q̄/qm)
2. The seller, on the other hand, has a decreasing profit margin (ps− c)/ps and market share
1− (q̄/qm)2 as the production cost increases in both regimes. Profit margins and market shares are
displayed in Figure 2.
Third, the market split depends on the production cost. When the production cost is low, the
seller can acquire a large proportion of the uses in the market; in fact, for c = 0 the seller has
three times the share of uses compared to the PPU provider. Thus, the seller benefits from a low
production cost. The low share of uses remaining to be served by the PPU provider does not
allow them to exploit the fact that they can amortize the production cost over many uses. In
other words, the PPU provider’s pooling cost benefit (i.e., cost amortization over uses) is weak,
limiting their profitability. However, at higher production cost, the indifferent customer’s usage,
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q̄, is increasing, as shown in Figure2. As a result, the PPU provider benefits more from stronger
pooling as the production cost increases, because he/she captures more market share (while the
seller is losing market share) and can serve these uses with a cost advantage. This enables the PPU
provider to increase profits faster than the seller. Note that the PPU’s profits increase quadratically
on the indifferent customer usage, q̄, while the seller’s profits depend linearly on q̄. However, as
the production cost increases further, the number of uses served by the PPU provider requires a
significantly higher overall logistics cost. It is that increase in the logistics costs that lowers the
PPU’s profitability for very high production costs, as it starts eating into his/her margin — which
is already capped by the maximum willingness to pay.
The relative profits together with market shares, profit margins, and indifferent customer usage
as functions of the production cost are illustrated in Figure 2 for a particular value of the logistics
cost, δ. Proposition 3 further compares the optimal profits of the duopoly competitors across all
admissible values of production cost c and delivery cost δ.





































Figure 2 Base model duopoly: example of seller’s and PPU provider’s profit margins, market share, indifferent customer,
and profits as a function of the product cost 0 6 c6 aqm for a particular per-use delivery cost, δ= 0.05a. In this example we
have taken qm = 10 and a= 1.
Proposition 3. There exists a threshold level of delivery cost δ, depending on production cost
c, δ̄(c), such that for δ 6 δ̄(c), the profits of the service provider are larger than the profits of the
seller (i.e., Π∗u(c, δ) > Π
∗
s(c, δ)). For δ > δ̄(c), the profits of the service provider are smaller than

















aqm < c6 aqm.
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Figure 3 Relative profitability of selling and PPU business models in (c, δ) space. Yellow area: PPU model more
profitable. Light blue area: selling model more profitable. Dark blue area: PPU model not feasible.
The proof of the above proposition is shown in Appendix A.2.4. The threshold is zero for infor-
mation goods (c = 0), which echoes the results of Balasubramanian et al. (2015), who find that
PPU is less profitable than selling in information goods sectors.
Figure 3 shows the iso-profit line and the areas of relative profitability of the two business
models in (c, δ) space. Interestingly, the PPU business model is the most profitable at intermediate
production cost levels: the PPU provider has a cost advantage over the seller because they sell uses
at fractions of the asset cost, an advantage that grows as the production cost increases. However,
the PPU provider also has a disadvantage with respect to the seller: with an increasing production
cost the PPU provider is servicing more uses at the expense of a higher overall logistics cost. The
lower the per-use logistics cost, δ is, the wider the range of intermediate production cost values, c,
for which PPU is more profitable than selling, as depicted in Figure 3. It must also be noted that
the PPU provider manages to gain better profits in both pricing regimes, and, therefore, the fact
of higher profitability cannot be attributed to the limit created by the constant willingness to pay.
Our analysis is economically meaningful, as a rough estimation with realistic numbers suggests.
Suppose a car dealer can buy a mid-range car for £27,000 and then choose whether to rent it out per
day (PPU) for a period of three years. In three years, the maximum usage quantity is approximately
1,000 days (with a rental almost every day), and suppose the willingness of customers to pay for
the mid-range car is £50 per day. The highest point of the δ̄ line in Figure 3 is (c, δ) = (27000,14),
while the maximum value that a customer would be willing to pay for using it every day (qma)
would be £50,000. Then in the model, the service-providing dealer (assuming that it could manage
a delivery cost of £14 per day) would charge £50 per day, get a market share of 77%, and make
a profit of £2,668, while a car-selling competitor would charge £38,500 for the car, get a market
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share of 23%, and make a profit of £2,645. Only customers with high usage would be willing to
buy the car. If technological changes allow the PPU dealer to have a service delivery cost of less
than £14 per day, it will achieve even higher profits and strongly outperform the seller. If the PPU
dealer cannot deliver the car rental service at a cost at or below £14, they will make a lower profit
than the selling dealer.
Our base model offers a novel justification for why PPU models arise across different industries.
This happens not as a mere business model differentiation choice in which the service provider
subsists but earns less than the seller. Instead, it happens because the PPU provider can be the
most profitable competitor in the market if they manage to contain the delivery cost. Moreover, our
results suggest possible reasons for why this PPU model advantage (and thus adoption) has grown
over time: automation and digitization have reduced both the delivery and production costs such
that many more PPU business models are now falling into the higher-profitability yellow zone, in
the medium production-cost range, of Figure 3. This is a non-trivial observation — if production
costs had become low across the board, and the threshold delivery cost, δ̄, had decreased this would
have resulted in less adoption of the PPU business model. In addition, although our model analysis
is static, it suggests possible industry shifts that may happen rapidly rather than gradually: as the
PPU business model becomes economically more attractive, sellers will shift toward it. Once they
do, they will quite quickly open up the large and under-serviced market of low-usage customers (as
illustrated in the example in the previous paragraph). This may result in a disruptive competitive
effect, as we have seen happen in many industries, from bicycles to tools (Hilti), cars (all car
manufacturers), and aircraft engines (Rolls-Royce) (see Kim et al. 2007, Johnson 2010).
4. Extensions to Different Consumer Behaviors
In the base model, we have assumed that customers, although heterogeneous in their usage quantity,
q, all exhibit the same willingness to pay a for a single use of the product and that their usage
quantity q is exogenously determined. In this section, we explore the robustness of our insights
for the duopoly case by relaxing those assumptions in three ways. First, we consider customers
who are heterogeneous, both in their usage quantities and in their willingness to pay for a use
of the product. Second, we consider customers that adjust their consumption, depending on the
price charged, to maximize their utility.6 Finally, we relax the assumption that customer usage is
uniformly distributed, and we allow for alternative distributions.
6 Following Wilson (1993), we assume in this extension that the utility is not linear in quantity, q, as in the base
model, but has a quadratic term.
Ladas, Kavadias, and Loch: Product Selling versus Pay-per-Use Service
17
4.1. Consumer Heterogeneity in Usage and Valuation
As in the base model, we assume that q ∈ [0, qm] is uniformly distributed across the same usage
quantity range, with f(q) = 1/qm. We now suppose that the customer’s willingness to pay for a
single use is also uniformly distributed in a∈ [0,1], with density g(a) = 1. Our assumption captures
an unbiased consumer market, where any customer type (q, a)∈ [0, qm]× [0,1] is present, including
customers who have high or low valuation but low usage needs, and customers who have high or
low valuation and high usage needs. The utility that a customer of type (q, a) gains from buying
the product at ps or using it for a per-use price, pu, is unchanged from the base model. The cost
structure also remains unchanged. The PPU model is able to attract any customer as long as
cu = c/qm + δ 6 1. A similar setting has been introduced and analyzed in Bala and Carr (2010),
for information goods with c= 0, where they find that in competition the seller outperforms the
service provider. Our work extends the above-mentioned work to account for all costs ,c 6= 0, and
shows that in a duopoly the service provider can outperform the seller in some areas of the (c, δ)
space. In this subsection we present the duopoly discussion between the selling and the service
business models. In Appendix A.3 we show the full analysis, both for monopoly and for duopoly.
We analyze the same subgame as in the base model, in which one firm sells the product at price,
ps, and the other uses a PPU business model pricing at pu. A straightforward calculation shows
the set of indifferent consumers to be {(q, a) | q= ps/pu and a> pu}. The market segmentation is
summarized in Figure 4. The service firm captures the market to the left of q= ps/pu line (smaller
usage quantities) and with a willingness to pay above pu. Customers who buy the product are
characterized by qa− ps > 0. Note that in this model the market is not fully covered by the two
providers. For a market to make economic sense, we must have c < qm and δ < 1 (“1” being the















Figure 4 Duopoly market segmentation in the (q, a) space. Light grey area: customers prefer to pay-per-use. Dark grey
area: customers prefer to buy. White area: customers abstain from the market.
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In Appendix A.3.2 we show that the optimal prices and profits for the product provider and the
























(p∗s − c)2(qm− p∗s)
qm(2p∗s − c)
where cu = c/qm+δ andW is the generalized Lambert W function (Corless et al. 1996, Mező 2017).
Figure 5 shows areas in the (c, δ) space where the service model (PPU) is more profitable than
the selling model. This result confirms that even when customers are heterogeneous in valuation,
the relative profitability is similar to the base model. There exists a service delivery cost threshold,
δ̄(c), below which the service provider attains more profit than the seller. This δ̄(c) increases in c
up to a maximum point and then decreases, as in the base model. Thus, our base model results
are robust and apply even when the willingness to pay is variable. Notably, in the special case
of information goods (c= 0) the selling model “always wins,” as shown by Bala and Carr (2010).
However, their insight cannot be extrapolated to non-zero production costs.
Figure 5 Duopoly relative profits as a function of the marginal cost of c and delivery cost δ. Light blue area: product
provider appropriates higher profits than pay-per-use one. Yellow area: higher profits for the PPU provider. Dark blue area:
PPU model not feasible.
The major difference with the base model is the following:7 the market is not covered in the
heterogeneous valuation duopoly, while in the base model the market is fully covered. This is a
direct consequence of heterogeneity in customer willingness to pay. As the valuation for a single use
ranges from [0,1], for any usage price, pu 6 1, customers with valuation a6 pu will abstain from
the market. Hence, the service provider sets a price, pu, to balance participation and abstinence.
7 We offer a more elaborate discussion in the Appendix A.3.3.
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This market share loss is reflected in the PPU provider profits and, in turn, reduces the region
where the PPU business model is more attractive. Still, though, the tension between the strong
pooling cost benefit versus the logistics cost extra burden drives a similar shape as to the one seen
in Figure 3.
4.2. Consumer Usage Sensitivity to Pricing
So far, we have assumed that customer usage, q, is independent of price. In this subsection we
extend the base model to accommodate consumers who are still heterogeneous in usage but decide
on their usage depending on price (Wilson 1993, Sundararajan 2004, Agrawal and Bellos 2016).
Customers are heterogeneous in two dimensions: with respect to their type, a, which is a proxy
for their willingness to pay for a unit of usage, and indirectly with respect to the actual usage,
q. We assume that a is uniformly distributed in [0,1]. Customers with large a derive more utility
from the same usage than customers with small a. Moreover, customers observe the price posted
by the seller and the PPU provider and then determine their usage by maximizing their net utility.
The net utility that a customer of type a derives from q units of usage under the selling model is
Us(a, q) = qa− 12q
2− ps and Uu(a, q) = qa− 12q
2− qpu under the PPU model. Note that U(a, q) is
increasing and concave in q.
In Appendix A.4 we derive the optimum prices and the resulting profits for the seller and the
PPU provider in duopoly. Figure 6 shows areas in the (c, δ) space where the service model (PPU)
is more profitable than the selling model. This result shows that even when customers determine
endogenously their usage quantities, the relative profitability of the PPU and the seller is similar
to the base model. Once more, there exists a service delivery cost threshold, δ̄(c), below which
the service provider attains more profit than the seller. Moreover, the same tension as in the base
model induces δ̄(c) to increase in c up to a maximum point and then to decrease. This indicates
that our base model results are also robust for more general utility functions.
4.3. Alternative Distributions of Customer Usage Profiles
The value of a uniform distribution does not come solely from the tractability that it provides.
A uniform distribution provides an additional conceptual benefit: its “equal weight to all possible
occurrences” prevents the results from stemming from contextual properties of the market cap-
tured by specific distributional assumptions. For example, a distribution skewed toward high-usage
customers could favor selling because high usage customers prefer to buy the product. Similarly, a
distribution skewed toward low-usage customers will help the PPU model because it engages low
usage customers. It is for that reason that a sizeable stream of literature in marketing has persis-
tently used a uniform distribution to analyze models of product differentiation, since the uniform
distribution introduces no prior bias in the customer demand. However, we do examine the effects
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Figure 6 Endogenous consumption model. Regions in (c, δ) space where the PPU model outperforms (underperforms)
the selling model. Dark blue region: seller’s profits are bigger than service provider profits. Yellow region: PPU provider’s
profits are bigger than seller’s profits
of alternative distributions on the relative profitability. We numerically test a scenario where the
customer usage follows a parametrized beta distribution where we vary the skew.
Suppose that customer usage is distributed according to f(q) with support in q ∈ [0,1]8 and that
the willingness to pay is constant, a. If the firms choose prices ps and pu then the profits for the
seller and the PPU provider are:








The best responses for the seller and the PPU provider can be found by solving the equations
∂Πs/∂ps = 0 and ∂Πu/∂pu = 0, which give the following system of nonlinear equations:




(pu− cu)G′(ps/pu) = 0 subject to pu 6 a





where Γ(z) is the gamma function. The beta distribution has finite support, q ∈ [0,1], and by
choosing the shape parameters we can shift the consumer mass toward lower or higher usage. We
numerically solve the nonlinear system of equations in two distinctive cases to compute the optimum
8 Taking qm = 1 without loss of generality.
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prices, p∗s and p
∗
u: (a) with distribution f(q; 1,2) (low-usage larger consumer mass); and (b) with
distribution f(q; 2,1) (high-usage larger consumer mass). The resulting profits are displayed in the
Figures 7a and 7b (which can be readily compared with the bottom-right panel of Figure 2. As
expected, when customer distribution is shifted to low usage, the PPU provider is more profitable
than the seller for a larger range of c values (as the PPU firm is strongest for low-usage customers
who do not benefit from owning a whole product). When the distribution is shifted to high usage,
the range of c for which PPU is more profitable is reduced; but notably it does not disappear.








































Figure 7 Profits of the seller and PPU provider as a function of the cost parameter c for δ= 0.15a
5. Uncertainty in the Usage Profiles: a Threat or an Opportunity?
The previous section has explored heterogeneity among consumers along their usage and their usage
valuation, where the consumer’s usage q was uniformly distributed U(0, qm) and the maximum
usage qm was known to the firms. In this section, we allow for the consumers’ usage distribution
being unknown to the firms in advance.9 In order to capture such uncertainty around the consumer’s
usage, as perceived by the firm, we build a model similar to Balasubramanian et al. (2015), where
the usage quantities are distributed as U(0, qm − v) with probability 1/2 and U(0, qm + v) with
probability 1/2, where v> 0 is a measure of the uncertainty or the knowledge gap of the firm about
the market. Proposition 4 summarizes the impact of usage uncertainty on firms’ profitability in
both monopoly and duopoly.
Proposition 4. If there exists uncertainty, v, in each consumer’s usage level:
1. In a monopoly, the seller behaves as if the maximum usage level was qm−v2/qm; its optimum
price and profit are described by the same formulas as in Section 3.1, adjusted by the transfor-
mation qm→ qm− v2/qm. The service provider is not affected by the uncertainty; its optimum
price and profit are the same as in the base model.
9 Recall that qm does not represent the product’s technical breakdown limit; most often, consumer products such
as phones or cars are not kept until they break, but they are replaced according to (possibly implicit) write-down
periods or because of style obsolescence. Consumers may know the total intended usage but the firm may not.
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2. In a duopoly, the seller behaves as if the maximum usage level were qm − v2/qm; its opti-
mum price and profit are described by the same formulas as in Section 3.3, adjusted by the
transformation qm→ qm− v2/qm. The service provider is also affected by the uncertainty and




m− v2)). The optimum price and profit of the service provider are described
by the same formulas as in Section 3.3, adjusted by the transformations qm→ qm−v2/qm and
c→ c(1 + v2/q2m).
The proof of the above proposition is in Appendix A.5. Proposition 4 offers two insights. First,
the monopoly analysis reveals that uncertainty in customers’ usage profiles, q, makes the PPU
provider flexible: if a customer uses the product a bit less or a bit more, the service provider does
not need to hedge against it because the revenue automatically adjusts. The service provider can
use the same price as in the base model. The seller, in contrast, must hedge against the usage
uncertainty by lowering its price and thus earning a lower profit. Thus, the service business model
(PPU) becomes more attractive for the monopolist.
The second insight is that, in the duopoly, this attractiveness reverses. The service provider
suffers more from the usage uncertainty than the seller. The reason is that, under competition, the
service provider must also hedge, not only against a change in volume but also against a change in
cost: the reader may recall that the cost per service unit is c/qm + δ. If qm is uncertain, the per-use
cost becomes also uncertain, which forces the service provider to hedge. In contrast, the seller does
not need to hedge against the cost because the unit production cost, c, is unaffected by the usage
uncertainty. In hedging, the service provider behaves as if it faced a higher allocated production











As a result of this higher “equivalent” cost, the service provider increases its price when compared
to the base model. This leads to a decreased market share and lower profits. In response, the seller
then lowers its price and recoups market share and profit.
Figure 8, analogous to Figure 3, shows areas in the (c, δ) space where the service model achieves
higher profits than the selling model in competition. For the reasons just explained, the area in
which the service model is preferable is smaller in Figure 8 than in Figure 3.
It is of course intriguing why the service provider is indifferent to usage uncertainty in the
monopoly setting but is affected from it in duopoly. As we see in the base model (see Appendix
A.8 and A.2.1) in monopoly the profits of the PPU provider depend linearly on qm and hence
variability cancels out. In duopoly, however, the profits of the PPU provider depend non-linearly
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Figure 8 Duopoly with uncertainty in qm: areas in the (c, δ) space where the PPU model is better than the selling
model. This example assumes a 10% uncertainty in qm. Yellow area: PPU more profitable. Light green area: selling more
profitable. Dark blue area: PPU model not feasible
in qm. Uncertainty not only affects usage, but also affects the per-use production cost c//qm. For
example, if there is a 10% uncertainty in the maximum use frequency (i.e, v2 = 0.1qm), the service
provider will behave as if the maximum use frequency is 0.9 qm and the production per-use cost is
1.1 c/qm. A “naive” allocation of production cost, c, over a stochastic number of uses changes the
service provider’s pricing decisions and the associated competitive dynamics.
This corresponds to an important phenomenon in reality: while the allocation of production
costs over usage occasions makes sense (the strategic element of strong pooling), allocating a
production cost to a usage among a stochastic total usage amount might violate the principle of
decision-relevant costing (Horngren et al. 2006, p. 383).
One method that simplifies accounting procedures and avoids allocating cost over stochastic uses
is called “standard costing” (Horngren et al. 2006, p. 229). It uses “normal” unit cost levels (fixed
or variable) rather than varying cost levels that are updated every period. If the service provider
in our model uses standard costing, rather than a naive allocation of production cost c, they leave
the service cost, cu, unaffected by the usage uncertainty. This means that the pricing decision will
be made based on a constant number for the per use cost, and, thus, the pricing decision of the
service provider changes back to the same one as in the base case. In our previous example, the
PPU provider will use a per-use production cost c/qm under standard costing, instead of 1.1 c/qm. In
other words, the service provider no longer hedges against per-use cost variations, while the seller
(regardless of which costing method they use) does need to hedge against usage uncertainty. As a
result, the service provider is unaffected by the usage uncertainty compared to the seller. Thus, if
the service provider uses an appropriate costing method (which does not allocate the production
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cost to a stochastic number of uses), the service business model gains in relative profitability over
the selling model (Figure 9).
Figure 9 Duopoly with uncertainty in qm under “standard costing”: areas in the (c, δ) space where the service model is
better than the selling model. This example assumes a 10% uncertainty in qm. Yellow area: PPU more profitable. Light green
area: selling more profitable. Dark Blue area: PPU model not feasible.
This insight points to an additional source of advantage of the PPU service business model over
selling: the service business model provides a source of flexibility against usage uncertainty (this
advantage may be widely relevant, as few products are bought in predetermined quantities). This,
however, depends on the decision-making approach of the service provider, which is represented
in our model either by the naive allocation of the production cost to service uses, or by standard
costing.
6. Delay Effects in PPU and the Need for Overcapacity
6.1. Homogeneous Customer Base
The base model assumed strong pooling of customer demand, which enables perfect asset uti-
lization. We now relax this assumption and examine the need for overcapacity to limit queueing
effects.
PPU services sometimes suffer from inefficiencies such as travelling to a PPU provider’s loca-
tion, or waiting one’s turn (queuing effects). In such cases, impatient customers suffer a utility
degradation from delays and are less willing to pay. In response, a PPU provider may adjust its
service level by deploying extra assets (i.e., excess capacity over strong pooling): an extra cost
(from overcapacity) is traded for a reduced willingness to pay. The seller may, of course, also face
inefficiencies in servicing its buyers, for example keeping a stock of assets to fulfill simultaneous
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demand. However, in this section we consider the one-sided (“conservative”) situation where only
the PPU provider faces delay inefficiencies.
Let 06 ρ6 1 denote the PPU’s asset utilization. A(ρ)6 a denotes impatience, or the willingness
to pay for a single use under the PPU model, where a is the willingness to pay for a single use
under the selling model or in the absence of any service inefficiencies. Naturally, suppose that when
ρ→ 0, A(ρ)→ a and when ρ→ 1, A(ρ)→ 0. In other words, infinite capacity would eliminate
service delays, whereas full capacity utilization (ρ→ 1) wipes out any value for the customer. This
is fulfilled by a simple service model such as the M/M/1 queue.
With c the production cost and δ the delivery cost per use, as before, the cost per use for the
PPU provider at asset utilization ρ becomes cu(ρ) = c/ρqm + δ. Clearly, cu(ρ) > cu, and cu(ρ) = cu
when ρ= 1. The utilities for a customer under the selling (Us) and the PPU model (Uu) are
Us = qa− ps and Uu = q(A(ρ)− pu),
where ps and pu are the prices of the seller and the PPU provider, respectively. We treat the asset
utilization parameter, ρ, as a decision variable; the PPU provider chooses first the utilization ρ
(which determines the service level), and subsequently both providers decide simultaneously on
prices pu and ps.
To analyze this further, we choose a reasonable function A(ρ) = ae−kρ/(1−ρ). The customer’s
utility falls exponentially with a service-level surrogate measure captured by the queueing factor
(the ratio of expected waiting divided by usage duration from the M/M/1 queue). The queueing
factor grows superlinearly with the asset utilization, for example, a utilization ρ = 90% results
in a queueing factor of ρ/(1 − ρ) = 9 (an expected non-value added time that is nine times as
high as the value added service time).10 The utility reduction is moderated by the parameter,
k, which represents the customer impatience. If we calibrate k = 0.01 as an example, then the
9-fold delay (and the need to call ahead) drops the customer’s utility by 9% to 0.91a, while at
the same time increasing the cost per use by 11% when compared to full asset utilization. For
this case, the duopoly problem is solved in Appendix A.6. The optimum utilization parameter,







with W0 be the Lambert function.
The optimum price is pu = a − A(ρ) + 2cu(ρ) for cu(ρ) 6 A(ρ) − a/2 and pu = A(ρ) for cu(ρ) >




(c+ qm(a−A(ρ) + pu)).
Figure 10 shows the areas in the (c, δ) space where the PPU model is more profitable than selling
for the parameter values just discussed. It is apparent that the area in which the PPU model is more
10 In real life, such as a car rental, this means that the customer should not just show up but call ahead a day or two
in advance.
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Figure 10 Service-level model in a duopoly: Areas in (c, δ) space where one model is more profitable than the other.
Dark blue area: the PPU model is not feasible. Light blue area: the selling model is more profitable. Yellow area: the PPU
model is more profitable.
profitable is smaller than for the base model. Obviously, if the customers are more impatient (higher
k) the area shrinks further. However, it is also apparent that the PPU-advantageous area remains
structurally similar. The PPU provider remains more profitable in the mid-range of production
costs. Hence, our main finding that there is a region in (c, δ) space where PPU is more profitable
than selling holds even when PPU suffers from delay inefficiencies.
Moreover, the PPU delay inefficiency diminishes with the number of assets — a large PPU
provider benefits from economies of scale, as already pointed out in Section 2. To see this, we
model the PPU provider as a M/M/n queuing system with inter-arrival times of mean 1/λ, service
times with mean 1/µ, and n parallel identical servers, corresponding to the assets deployed (think
of the PPU provider’s car fleet). With ρ= λ/(nµ) the PPU provider’s asset utilization (ρ6 1), the
probability of waiting Pw is given by Kleinrock (1975), where α= nρ













The probability of waiting longer than t is P (W > t) = Pwe
−nµ(1−λ/(nµ))t = Pwe
−(nµ−λ)t. Then the
service level, S(t), the probability that a customer has to wait less than t, becomes:
S(t) = 1−P (W > t) = 1−Pwe−(nµ−λ)t.
Now consider two PPU providers of the same service (take car rentals as an example) with
different demand levels. Provider (1) operates in a large town and faces λ1 = 50 customers per day,
and provider (2) operates in a small town and faces λ2 = 5 customers per day. Both PPU providers
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have the same average usage time, 1/µ= 2 days (the time that customers keep the cars). Provider
(1)’s minimum capacity (at 100% utilization, as is feasible under strong pooling) is n01 = 100 cars,
while provider (2)’s minimum capacity is n02 = 10 cars. Suppose that each provider chooses a
capacity (a fleet size) n1 >n01 and n2 >n02 such that customers, on average, wait 1/10 of the mean
service time (of 2 days). The service levels S1 and S2 for the providers as a function of the servers
n1 and n2 are
S1 = 1−Pw(n1, a1)e−0.1(n1−a1)
S2 = 1−Pw(n2, a2)e−0.1(n2−a2)
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Figure 11 Service level for two PPU providers as a function of servers over strong pooling
Figure 11 plots the service level as a function of excess servers (cars above the “strong pooling”
capacity). We see that to achieve a service level of 90%, provider (1) needs to deploy 9 additional
cars (an overcapacity of 9%), while provider (2) needs to deploy 5 additional cars (an overcapacity
of 50%). For the large provider, a 9% overcapacity does not substantially affect its profitability.
However, for the small PPU provider, the overcapacity represents an important hurdle. This illus-
trates the economies of scale at work, which reduce the delay inefficiencies for large PPU providers.
This further supports our conclusion that a deviation from strong pooling may hurt the PPU
provider but does not affect the main findings of our study.
6.2. Service and Price Discrimination
While delay inefficiencies may hurt the PPU provider, they also represent an opportunity if cus-
tomers exhibit heterogeneity in their patience (k). This offers the PPU provider an opportunity
to differentiate on the quality of service, following from the model setup presented in the previous
subsection. Suppose that w% of customers are patient (with k1 = 0) and (1−w)% are impatient
Ladas, Kavadias, and Loch: Product Selling versus Pay-per-Use Service
28
(with k2 > 0, A(ρ;k2) < a ). While impatient customers need overcapacity and priority, patient
customers are willing to book in advance according to a fixed schedule, which enables the PPU
provider to keep them from overlapping and therefore to apply strong pooling. If the PPU provider
can identify the customer’s patience (for example, by asking them), it can discriminate and service
one type only (i.e., the patient or the impatient), leaving the other type to the seller. Alternatively,
the PPU provider can choose to service both types but price the service depending on the cus-
tomer’s type. Note that the seller has no such flexibility and addresses the whole market with a
single price.












PPU and Seller Profits
PPU after all customers with 2 prices
PPU after patient customers only
PPU after impatient customers only
Seller when PPU after all customers with 2 prices
Seller when PPU after patient customers only
Seller when PPU after impatient customers only
Figure 12 PPU and seller’s profits as a function of production cost c for δ= 0.05a when PPU services (a) the patient
customer only, (b) the impatient customers only, (c) both customer segments with different prices. The customer mix is 80%
patient and 20% impatient.











PPU and Seller Profits (Envelope)
PPU Envelope
Seller Envelope
Figure 13 PPU and seller’s maximum profits as a function of production cost c for δ= 0.05a.The customer mix is 80%
patient and 20% impatient.
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Figure 12 shows the PPU provider’s and seller’s profits as a function of the production cost, c,
when the PPU provider can select to service (a) the patient segment only, (b) the impatient segment
only, or (c) both segments with two different prices. The derivations can be found in Appendix A.7.
In Figure 13 we show the envelope profits (i.e., the best strategy given the production cost) for the
seller and the PPU provider. Note that the PPU envelope profit is continuous, while the seller’s
respective curve is discontinuous. This happens because the seller, as seen even in the base model,
responds to PPU pricing. Thus, as the PPU provider switches strategies, this response becomes
discontinuous. The figure suggests two key insights. First, the PPU provider’s chosen service strat-
egy changes with the level of production cost, c. For very low c, the PPU provider optimally serves
only the impatient customer segment. Overcapacity is cheap, while exploiting the strong pooling
offers no advantage, as seen in the base model. In contrast, for high c the PPU provider is better
off servicing the patient customers only, as the cost of building overcapacity becomes prohibitive,
and the strong pooling effect is very beneficial. Finally, in the medium production cost range, the
PPU provider is better off price discriminating across both segments.
Second, the PPU business model is again superior to selling in the medium-production cost
range, as in the base model. Notably, servicing the patient customers only allows the PPU provider
to sustain profit dominance beyond what it would achieve by committing to servicing both types.
By exploring the heterogeneity in customer patience, the PPU business model can achieve relative
dominance, even for expensive assets.11 Thus, service quality discrimination suggests an additional
possible explanation for the recent proliferation of PPU models in industries with significant man-
ufacturing costs (e.g., Kim et al. (2007)).
7. Discussion and Conclusion
The model proposed in this paper compares the profitability of two business models: traditional
product selling versus the provision of the same product “as a service” with a pay-per-use (PPU)
price. Customers derive utility from each use of the product, and they are heterogeneous with
respect to how many uses they require. Firms (either as monopolists or in a competitive duopoly)
buy or manufacture the product at a given unit cost, and then they sell the product or offer it as
a PPU service. PPU service providers incur an additional service delivery or logistics cost for each
use they provide.
Our work explores the circumstances under which the PPU business model is more profitable
than product selling in competition. Previous work on the selling versus PPU business models has
either considered only monopolists or focused solely on information goods (goods with negligible
11 If the relative size of the two segments is 50-50 or 20-80, rather than 80-20 (80% of customers being patient and
20% impatient), the insights remain qualitatively unchanged.
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manufacturing costs) and has concluded that product selling is more profitable than PPU in com-
petitive equilibria (Balasubramanian et al. 2015, Bala and Carr 2010). This implies that the PPU
may arise as a competitive differentiation strategy, but it represents the less attractive business
model. Our analysis establishes that non-zero production costs fundamentally change the relative
profitability of the two business models in equilibrium, with a significant area in the (production
cost, delivery cost) space where the PPU model is more profitable. The area in the space of (pro-
duction cost, logistics cost) where PPU business models are more profitable than selling comprises
mid-range production costs combined with low delivery costs, which represent a “sweet spot” for
PPU business models.
Indeed, PPU business models have become widely adopted across many industries in the last two
decades (Kavadias et al. 2016, Crozet and Milet 2017). Our model suggests a possible explanation
for why PPU models have spread across industries; PPU models are not mere competitive differen-
tiators, but they can become more profitable ones provided a company operates in an appropriate
cost regime.
The qualitative result of our base model remains valid when we extend it to account for consumers
that exhibit additional heterogeneity in their willingness to pay for each use, or consumers that
endogenously choose usage quantities with heterogeneous service valuations; and the model also
remains valid when market friction weakens competition. The findings of the base model remain
structurally similar even when we introduce delay inefficiencies into the PPU model. Although the
PPU model becomes relatively less attractive, the delay disadvantage of the PPU model diminishes
with economies of scale (if the PPU provider becomes larger); and, moreover, customer delays and
impatience may also be characterized by patience heterogeneity, which enables the PPU provider
to discriminate on customer service delays and improve his/her market share and profitability.
Furthermore, we show that PPU models further benefit from the PPU firm’s flexibility toward
unpredictable customers’ usage quantities: the seller needs to hedge in its pricing against this
uncertainty in usage. In contrast, the service provider offers a PPU contract, which linearly scales
up and down if the customer uses more or fewer uses of the product. Thus, the structure of the PPU
model does not require hedging in its pricing against demand uncertainty and allows for lowering
prices, gaining market share, and driving profitability. However, this PPU advantage depends on
an operational capability, namely, the use of standard costing that enables the firm to avoid naive
allocation of a fixed production cost over a stochastic number of uses. Without this ability, the
PPU business model loses its competitive advantage.
Our findings have clear managerial relevance. For information goods, PPU was shown to be a
competitive response but inferior (less profitable than selling) in equilibrium. For manufactured
goods, managers should be looking at PPU as a competitive weapon with the potential to gain
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dominance in equilibrium (over selling). However, this potential does not apply across the full
product range of. First, PPU services offer little advantage for either very cheap products (where
customer may as well buy outright), or very expensive products (where the production cost share
per use is enough to deter cost sensitive users). Second, a critical ratio of costs can serve as a guide
for identifying products that may benefit from PPU: the relative magnitude of logistic to production
cost. This ratio provides a bound for the “allowable” logistics cost (as a fraction of production
cost) so that a PPU service can be more profitable than selling. Third, a key source of value for
a PPU business model lies in flexibility: flexibility with respect to varying (unpredictable) usage
levels (against which a seller needs to hedge), and flexibility with respect to customer heterogeneity
in impatience, which enable availability, service level and price discrimination. In summary, our
model gives the manager a conceptual guide for a strategic analysis of business model choice over
the product range.
At a broader level, our paper also contributes to an ongoing discussion about the effects of
digitization on business models (Kavadias et al. 2016). Over the last twenty years, digital tech-
nologies have been credited with transforming traditional business models away from selling and
towards PPU services, and a commonly cited reason is that ”tracking has become cheaper”. Our
analysis qualifies this claim: digital technologies have shifted both production and logistic costs.
The evolution is by no means one-directional – if production costs diminish, the position of the
PPU model in the (production cost, logistics cost) space may actually be pushed outside its sweet
zone and reduce its attractiveness. Examples are video streaming services being offered for a fixed
subscription fee, or cellphone plans offered with a fixed fee for service, moving away from PPU.
Overall, our insights suggest empirically testable hypotheses for the proliferation (or not) of PPU
business models across different industrial settings.
As in any model of this type, we make several limiting assumptions. For example, we do not
consider products that are rented until they “wear out,” that is, where the maximum usage is
determined technically rather than by customer conventions or procedures. This seems to be the
case in a minority of industries, so we have left it out of our analysis, but we consider it an interesting
topic for future research. Also, the two business models may trigger customer behavioral biases in
different ways. An extensive literature shows that attributes of a pricing plan may affect behavior
beyond direct cost implications (Ascarza et al. 2012, Lambrecht and Skiera 2006). The impact of
biases on usage is a topic for future research. Another area of future work may be uncertainty
in the technical maximum usage, which would have different effects than the imperfect firm’s
knowledge about the customer usage profiles that we currently analyze. In addition, our model is
static. Important elements of competition change over time when there is technological progress
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that affects costs or functionality (and thus willingness to pay). These could be examined in a two-
period model and would call for a separate study. Finally, our model does not fully address tactical
issues such as the coordination and set-up costs across product switching, and the stochastic nature
of the service delivery; customers might choose not to wait when queue waiting time is considerably
long but to revisit the service provider. Future research should examine the implementation and
limitations of strong pooling, as well as process effects that may influence strategic business model
viability. We hope that this contribution opens up further relevant analytical or quantitative (rather
than qualitative) work on service provision business models.
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A.1.1. Monopolist’s prices and profits When the monopolist sets a price ps for the product, a
customer of consumption profile q enjoys utility U(q;ps) = aq − ps. The customer of profile q buys the
product if U > 0. Hence, customers with frequency q > ps/a will purchase, and customers with q < ps/a do





(ps − c)f(q)dq = 1qm (ps − c)(qm −
ps
a
). The value ps that maximizes the profit Πs(ps) satisfies the
first order condition ∂Πs/∂ps = 0. It is straightforward to show that the price and the maximum profits of





(aqm − c)2. The market share
for the product provider is Ms = 1− p∗s/(aqm). Note that when c= 0, customers with use profile q > qm/2
buy the product and the market share is qm/2. As the cost increases (c→ aqm), the marginal customer shifts
to higher use moving towards qm and the monopolist’s market share diminishes gradually to zero.
Instead of selling, a monopolist can choose to deliver a service where she charges pu for a single use of
the product. Then a customer with profile q will enjoy utility U(q;pu) = q(a − pu). Under such a selling
mechanism, any customers enjoys a positive utility for every pu 6 a. If pu > a no consumer purchases the
service and the monopolist gets zero profit. The profit maximization problem can be written as follows:
maxpu6aΠu(pu) where Πu(pu) =
∫ qm
0
(pu − cu)qf(q)dq = 12qm(pu − cu) It is straightforward to establish that
∂Πu/∂pu = qm/2> 0, in other words, Πu(pu) is an increasing function of pu and hence the maximum profit
is attained at pu = a. Then the optimal price and the maximum profit for the pay-per-use scheme are








and the market is covered (i.e, Mu = 1). Note that because the
service provider bears a cost per use δ is limited to offer the pay-per-use solution up to costs c6 qm(a− δ).






(aqm + c) p
∗
u = a















A.1.2. Proof of Proposition 1 There exists a value of c that makes the maximum profits of the pay
per use and the selling mechanism equal, i.e., Π∗s = Π
∗
u. Using the expressions for the profits presented
in section 3.1 it is straightforward to show that the value of c that makes the profits equal is given by
c= qm
√
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A.2. Base model: Duopoly
A.2.1. Duopoly prices and profits In a duopoly we assume that one firm acts as a product provider
who uses the selling mechanism setting a price at ps offering unrestricted usage of the product, and the other
firm acts as a service provider and employs the pay-per-use mechanism asking pu per one use of the product.
The indifferent customer gets the same utility both from buying the product and from buying uses of the
product. In other words, the indifferent customer is at frequency q̄ for which Us(q̄;ps) = Uu(q̄;pu). Solving
this equation for q̄ it can be easily seen that q̄ = ps/pu. Customers with frequency q ∈ [q̄, qm] prefer to buy
the product and customers with frequency q ∈ [0, q̄] prefer to use the service and to pay according to their
























(c+qmpu) as the seller’s best response. The service provider will choose its price pu as to maximize her
profits Πu subject to the constraint pu ≤ a. The Lagrangian for the service provider’s constrained optimization
problem is Λ(pu, µ) = Πu(pu) +µ(a− pu). The solution for pu and µ must satisfy the KKT conditions
∂Πu
∂pu
−µ= 0 , µ(a− pu) = 0 , pu 6 a , µ> 0






Setting the above expression to zero gives the solution pu,1 = 2cu which satisfies all the KKT conditions when
cu < a/2. When µ 6= 0 we have pu,2 = a which gives µ= p2s(2cu− a)/(2qma3) which is positive provided cu >
a/2. Therefore, when the cost c6 1
2
qm(a−2δ), the service provider will ask a price per use at pu = 2( cqm + δ)
(a price double than the cost of producing one use of the product or service), he will capture market form










In response, the product provider will set a price at ps =
1
2





When c > 1
2
qm(a− 2δ) the service provider cannot continue this policy (pricing at double the cost) as this
price will exceed the customer’s willingness to pay a. He will then price at pu = a and the product provider
in response will price at 1
2









(qm(a− δ)− c)(aqm + c)2
The market shares for the product provider Ms and the service provider Mu are respectively, Ms = 1− q̄/qm
and Mu = q̄/qm. The overall solution for the duopoly problem for both firms is given in the following table.
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It can be easily verified the solutions for the profits of the service provider and for the product provider
are continuous in c.
A.2.2. Equilibrium analysis of the base model (Proof of Proposition 2) If both firms use the
same business model they compete themselves down to zero profits under Bertrand competition. Each firm
can lower its selling price ps or pay-per-use fee pu to undercut the other. Therefore, the (s, s) and (u,u)
sub-games will have zero payoffs for both firms. On the other hand, if each firm is committing to a different
business model, they will assume non zero profits Πs > 0 for the selling firm and Πu > 0 for the firm using
PPU. The expressions for profits Πs and Πu are derived in appendix (A.2.1).
We consider the “hybrid” case where one firm is offering both business models (sell and PPU) at prices
(ps1 , pu1) and the other is offering just PPU at pu2 . The firm offering only pay-per-use will compete down
to cu with the firm that is offering both models. and hence the pay-per-use fee will be pu1 = pu2 = cu. The
firm that is offering only PPU will realize zero profits and the firm that is offering both models will realize
profits only form selling. Given that the PPU price is at pu = cu, the indifferent customer is at q̄= ps/cu and





(ps − c)(qm − ps/cu). The firm will set
ps as to maximize the profits. The optimum price will be ps =
1
2




(qmcu− c)2. It is straight forward to show that Π′s <Πs.
The symmetric problem is when one firm offers both models at prices (ps1, pu1) and the other is offering
just selling at ps2. The firm offering only the selling model will compete down to ps1 = ps2 = c with the firm
that is offering both models. So the firm offering only selling will realize zero profits and the firm that offers
both models will realize profits Π′u only from customers attracted by the pay-per-use model. Given that the








firm will try to set pu as to maximize the profits. The optimum price will be pu = 2cu for cu 6 a/2 and pu = a





for cu 6 a/2 and Π′u =
(a−cu)c2
2qma2
for cu > a/2. It is
straightforward to show that Π′u <Πu.
In case where both firms offer both business models (selling and PPU) they will compete down to cost for
both the selling part and the PPU part. The prices will be pu = cu and ps = c and both firms will end up
with zero profits.
Ladas, Kavadias, and Loch: Product Selling versus Pay-per-Use Service
38
The normal form representation of the game is:
Sell PPU Both
Sell 0,0 Πs,Πu 0, Π
′
u






There are two asymmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibria in the game where the two firms offer identical
products, with one firm selling and the other using PPU business model.
For the mixed-strategy equilibrium for the normal game in which one firm is using selling and the com-
petitor uses PPU we have the following. Each firm can adopt a mixed-strategy in which the probability λs of
selling makes the other firm indifferent between selling and PPU. This probability then satisfies (1−λs)Πs =
λsΠu which gives λs = Πs/(Πs + Πu).
A.2.3. Imperfect Market As in the base model, suppose customers want q uses of the product, with
q uniformly distributed between zero and qm. The customers have a reservation price a per use. To model
market imperfection, we assume that customers come in two types, informed and uninformed. Uninformed
customers select a firm at random; a customer of type q buys the product from a seller that asks a price
ps if aq 6 ps or buys q uses of the product from a PPU provider if the price pu 6 a. Informed customers, in
contrast, know the business models and prices and select that firm that maximizes their utility. Let λ be the
percentage of uninformed customers where 0 6 λ6 1. Firms attempt to price discriminate between informed
and uninformed customers. In what follows we use the notation Πim, Πid for the monopoly and duopoly
profits for i= {s,u} and pim, pid for the corresponding optimal prices as presented in the base model. We

















The (s, s) and (u,u) subgame: Assume that two firms sell identical goods at prices ps1 and ps2. If firm 1
post a price ps1 < ps2, she will get
λ
2
customers that have a usage profile q6 ps1/a and all the 1−λ customers
with usage profile q6 ps1/a. If firm1 posts a price ps1 > ps2 she will get only λ2 of the uninformed customers






Πsm(ps1) ps1 > ps2
1
2
Πsm(ps1) ps1 = ps2
(1− λ
2
)Πsm(ps1) ps1 < ps2
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where Πsm(ps1) are the monopoly profits for price ps1. In this duopoly game firms enter the market if they
get at least λ
2
Πsm(psm) profits. Varian (1980, p. 654) shows this game has no symmetric price equilibrium in
pure strategies. He assumes that firms choose prices randomly out of a distribution density f(ps) which has
a cumulative distribution function F (ps). Varian (1980) shows that there exists a cumulative distribution
function F (ps) that maximizes the expected profits for each firm. Moreover, the expected profits for each
firms are the optimal monopolist profits for the uninformed customer segment. Therefore, the expected
profits of both firms will be




for i= 1,2 where psm is the monopoly price psm =
1
2
(c+ aqm). When there is no market friction (λ= 0), the
expected profits are zero inline with Bertrand’s competition for identical products result.
The (u,u) sub-game can be treated in exactly the same way. The expected profits of both firms will be
the optimal monopolist profits for the uninformed customer segment




for i= 1,2, where pum is the monopolist price pum = a. When there is no market friction, (λ= 0) the expected
profits drop to zero inline with Bertrand’s competition result for identical products.
The (s,u) subgame: We assume that one firm sells the product at price ps and the other firms offers
uses of the product at price pu per use. Each provider gets monopoly profits from
λ
2
part of the uninformed
customers and engages in competition for the 1 − λ uninformed customers from which she gets duopoly









Πum(ps) + (1−λ)Πud(ps, pu)






















u− (1−λ)p2s(pu− 2cu) = 0
















uλ− (1−λ)p2sλ(puλ− 2cu) = 0 (4)
puλ 6 a (5)
The equilibrium profits are Πsλ(psλ, puλ) and Πuλ(psλ, puλ). Note that equations (3) and (4) form a system
of nonlinear equations of fifth degree in pu and one cannot expect to track it analytically.
Equation (4) implies that pu > 2cu, otherwise the second term is negative and subtracted from the first
term which is positive gives always a positive result. But if cu > a/2 then pu > a and therefore the solution
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aqm). Therefore, when cu > a/2 the equilibrium prices for the λ problem are the monopoly prices allowing
equilibrium profits to be expressed in closed form as shown below




















As is evident from the above equations, equilibrium profits are functions of c and cu = c/qm + δ.
For cu < a/2 there are no closed form solutions. But we can compare the equilibrium profits. Let psλ and
puλ denote the equilibrium prices. Because puλ is the Nash price, any other price different from this will
give lower profits. Therefore, Πuλ(psλ, puλ)>Πuλ(psλ, a). But Πuλ(psλ, a) =
λ
2






Πsm(psm). The last inequality comes from the fact that when cu < a/2, the monopoly profits
of PPU are greater than the monopoly profits of the selling scheme as we have shown in the base section.
Therefore, for all λ and for cu <a/2, we have that Πuλ(psλ, puλ)>
λ
2
Πsm(psm). This implies that for cu <a/2
the equilibrium can be either (u, s), or (s,u), or (u,u). Said differently, the equilibrium cannot be (s, s) for
cu <a/2.
For cu < a/2, the equilibrium prices psλ and puλ are smaller than the monopoly prices so we have
that psλ < psm and puλ < a. We can show that Πsλ(psλ, puλ) < Πsλ(psm, pum). Indeed, Πsλ(psm, pum) =
λ
2
Πsm(psm) + (1 − λ)Πsd(psm, pum) = λ2 Πsm(psm) + (1 − λ)Πsm(psm). On the other hand, Πsλ(psλ, puλ) =
λ
2
Πsm(psλ) + (1− λ)Πsd(psλ, puλ). But Πsm(psλ) < Πsm(psm) because psm is the optimum monopoly price.
Also, Πsd(psλ, puλ) < Πsd(psλ, pum) because Πsd(ps, pu) is an increasing function in pu
12. Therefore, we
have that Πsλ(psλ, puλ) < Πsλ(psm, pum). But Πsλ(psm, pum) = (1 − λ2 )Πsm(psm) and hence we have that
Πsλ(psλ, puλ)< (1− λ2 )Πsm(psm). Because Πsm(psm)<Πum(pum) for cu <a/2, it is straightforward to show
13
that there is λ0 < 1 such that for λ> λ0, (1− λ2 )Πsm(psm)<
λ
2
Πum(pum). We have therefore shown that for
cu <a/2 and for λ> λ0, Πsλ(psλ, puλ)<
λ
2
Πum(pum) which implies that the equilibrium is (u,u).




psλ is the equilibrium price, Πsλ(psλ, puλ)> Πsλ(psd, puλ)> (1− λ)Πsλ(psd, puλ)> (1− λ)Πsλ(psd, pud). The
last equality comes from the fact that Πsd is an increasing function in pu and that puλ > pud = 2cu. It is
straightforward to show14 that there exists λ1 < 1 such that for λ < λ1, (1− λ)Πsd(psd, pud)> λ2 Πum(pum).
Therefore, there exists a λ1 < 1 such that for λ< λ1 we have asymmetric equilibrium is (u, s) or (s,u).
The overall game Each firm can choose one of the two strategies: either to play (s) or to play (u). The







Πsm(psm) Πsλ(psλ, puλ) , Πuλ(psλ, puλ)







12 It is straightforward to show that ∂Πsd/∂pu > 0.
13 Indeed, λ0 = 2Πsm(psm)/(Πsm(psm) + Πum(pum). Because Πsm(psm)<Πum(pum), then λ0 < 1
14 Indeed, λ1 = 2Πsd(psd, pud)/(2Πsd(psd, pud) + Πum(pum)) which is always positive and smaller than one.
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The following figures depict the outcomes of a family of games for all feasible values of c and δ for specific
values of the market friction parameter λ. We present two scenarios: a small market friction λ= 10%, where
just 10% of the customers are uninformed, and significant market friction, where 50% of the customers are
uninformed.
Figure 14 Equilibria for small friction λ= 10% case in the (c, δ) space. Light Blue area: Equilibrium at (u, s) or (s,u),
Yellow area: Equilibrium at (s, s), Green area: Equilibrium at (u,u), Dark Blue area: PPU not feasible.
Figure 15 Equilibria for significant friction λ= 50% case. Light Blue area: Equilibrium at (u, s) or (s,u), Yellow area:
Equilibrium at (s, s), Green area: Equilibrium at (u,u), Dark Blue area: PPU not feasible
Figures 14 and 15 suggest that for small values of c and large values of δ, the equilibrium is (s, s) (selling
dominates even under head-to-head competition). For large values of c and small values of δ the imperfect
market game equilibrium becomes (u,u) (PPU is more attractive even under head-to-head competition). For
all other regions in the (c, δ) space, we get an asymmetric equilibrium (u, s) or (s,u) as in the base model.
It is striking that even in the scenario of significant market friction (50% of customers are uninformed), the
asymmetric equilibria arise across the largest portion of the feasible parameter space.
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A.2.4. Equilibrium profits comparison (Proof of Proposition 3) The iso-profit line consists of
points in (c, δ) space where the profits for the two mechanisms are equal. For c6 qm(a2 − δ) the condition
Πs = Πu, after substituting the relevant expressions for the profits from Appendix (A.2.1) leads to the
equation (5c+6δqm)(c−2δqm) = 0, which gives c= 2δqm or δ = c/(2qm). The second solution of the quadratic
equation gives a negative δ. Because this is valid for c6 qm(a2 − δ) this leads to an upper bound for δ i.e.,




For c > qm(
a
2
−δ) the condition Πs = Πu, after substituting the relevant expressions from Appendix (A.2.1),
leads to the equation 2aqm(aqm− c)2 = (qm(a− δ)− c)(aqm + c)2. Solving for δ we find
δ = a− c
qm
− 2a (aqm− c)
2
(aqm + c)2
The derivative with respect to c is
∂δ/∂c=
c3 + 3ac2 + 11a2q2mc− 7a3q3m
qm(aqm + c)3
The condition ∂δ/∂c= 0 gives the value of c that maximizes δ which is c≈ 0.542aqm and the maximum value
of δ is δmax ≈ 0.286a.
A.3. Heterogeneity in valuation
A.3.1. Monopoly The product provider will set a price ps. Customers with qa> ps will buy the product
and customers with qa < ps will abstain from the market. In this case the iso-utility curves are hyperbolas

















The price ps that maximizes seller’s profits must satisfy condition ∂Πs/∂ps = 0, which gives,
1
qm




Equation 7 is a transcendental equation that can be solved with the help of the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Equations of the form (Ax+C) lnx−Bx= a for A,B,a real numbers and A 6= 0 and B 6= 0













where W is the generalized Lambert function
We note that equation 7 is in the form of the equation in Lemma 1 with A= 2, B = 1, C =−c/qm, and
a=−1. Applying the results of Lemma 1 we arrive at













The corresponding profits can be expressed in terms of the price ps. We can solve equation 7 for ln(ps/qm)
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The service provider, in a monopoly setting, will set a price pu as to maximize his profits. Customers with
a> pu i.e, customers that are willing to pay more than pu will participate in the market irrespective of the











The condition ∂Πu/∂pu = 0 gives as pu =
1
2
(1 + cu). Substituting back into the equations for the profits, we




A.3.2. Duopoly In duopoly one firm decides to offer a fixed-based pricing scheme at ps and the other
to offer a pay-per use scheme at pu. The two firms compete by truncating the others segment along the line
q= ps/pu which is the locus of the indifference between fixed and usage based pricing. The profits each firm















Carrying out the integration for the profits of the service provider, it can be readily found that Πu =
1
2qm
(pu− cu)(1− pu)(ps/pu)2 and that ∂Πu/∂pu =−p2s(cu(pu− 2) + pu)/2qmp3u. The condition ∂Πu/∂pu = 0
leads to pu = 2cu/(1 + cu). It can be readily seen that pu 6 1 as long as cu 6 1 and there is no need for a
break point in prices as we has in the base model. Substituting the solution for the service provider’s price
to the equation for the service provider’s profits we arrive at Πu =
(1−cu)2p2s
8qmcu
. Carrying out the integration
for the product provider’s profits we can find that
















+ (2ps− c) ln(ps/qmpu) + (ps− c) = 0 (11)












We can use Lemma 1 with A= 2, B = (2− pu)/pu, C =−c/(qmpu), and a= (pu(c− qm)− c)/(p2uqm). The
solution for the price of the seller then becomes






























Solving equation 11 for ln ps
qmpu
and substituting into equation 10, we can express the profits of the seller in
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A.3.3. Comparison Between the Base Model and the Extension with Heterogeneous Valua-
tion Customers The base model and the heterogeneous valuation model cannot be directly compared as
they have a different total willingness to pay and a different cost support. The base model can support costs
up to aqm, while the heterogeneous valuation model (with willingness to pay up to am) can support costs
up to amqm. For both models having the same cost support it is required that a= am. But then the models
have a different total willingness to pay. In the base model, where the customers place a constant value of a






In the heterogeneous valuation model, in which customers are willing to pay up to am per use, the total








This means that the two models (uniform a versus heterogeneous willingness to pay) can have the same total
willingness to pay but they support different cost ranges, or they can have the same cost support but with
different total willingness to pay.
A.4. Endogenous q model
In this section we examine a model the usage q is endogenous. Customers observe the price under the
given business model and decide on usage by maximizing their utility. Customers are heterogeneous in two
parameters: the type a which is roughly equivalent to the willingness to pay for a unit of usage and in usage
q. Customers with large a derive more utility from the same usage than customers with small a. We assume
that both a and q are uniformly distributed in [0,1]. The net utility a customer of type a derives from q
units of usage under the selling model is Us(a, q) = qa− 12q
2 − ps and Uu(a, q) = qa− 12q
2 − qpu under the
PPU model. Note that U(a, q) is increasing and concave in q.
A.4.1. Monopoly for the selling or the PPU model Given a price ps, a customer of type a will
choose qs,m that will maximize his utility. The first order condition ∂Us/∂q= 0 gives qs,m = a and the utility
at the maximum usage is Us,m(a) =
1
2
a2 − ps. Customers with type a >
√
2ps have a positive utility and
participate in the market and customers with a<
√
2ps will abstain. The number of customers that will buy
is 1−
√
2ps and the profit the seller will realize will be Πs(ps) = (p− c)(1−
√
2ps). The first order condition
∂Πs/∂ps = 0 gives p
∗
s = (1 + 3c+
√
6c+ 1)/9 and maximum profit Π∗s = (1− 18c+
√
(6c+ 1)3)/27.
Given a price per use pu, a customer of type q will choose qu,m that will maximize his utility. The first
order condition ∂Uu/∂q= 0 gives qu,m = a−pu and the utility at the maximum usage is Uu,m(a) = 12 (a−pu)
2.
As the usage has to be positive, customers with type a > pu participate in the market, while customers
with a< pu abstain. The number of uses Mu required by the customers is Mu =
∫ 1
pu
(a− pu)da= 12 (1− pu)
2.
The number of customers that participate in the market are Nu = 1− pu. The profits for the monopolist
are Πu(pu) = Mu(pu − δ)− λNuc = 12 (pu − δ)(1− pu)
2 − λc(1− pu) where λ < 1 is the pooling factor that





1 + δ2− 3λc− 2δ)/3. For a level of service equivalent to the one in the base model (strong pooling),
Ladas, Kavadias, and Loch: Product Selling versus Pay-per-Use Service
45
we assume that the maximum uses the product can deliver is one and the cost per use is cu = c+δ. Therefore
the profit for the PPU provider becomes Πu(pu) =
1
2
(pu−cu)(1−pu)2. The first order condition ∂Πu/∂pu = 0
gives the optimal price at p∗u =
1
3





A.4.2. Competition between selling and PPU model Given prices ps and pu customers find the
quantities qs,m and qu,m that maximize their utility. These optimum quantities are as in monopoly qs,m = a
and qu,m = a− pu. Customers’ utility at the optimum quantities are Us,m = a
2
2
− ps and Uu,m = 12 (a− pu)
2.
Customers choose among three options: not participating (remain inactive), buying uses from the PPU
provider or buying the product from the seller. The indifferent customer a1 between remain inactive and
buying is at Uu,m(a1) = 0 which gives a1 = pu. The indifferent customer a2 between buying uses and buying






. So the number of customers in the inactive,








pu. The number of uses required by customers
that adopt PPU model are Mu =
∫ a2
a1





)2. The profits for the seller and the PPU
provider (under pooling factor λ) are
























The first order conditions ∂Πs/∂ps = 0 and ∂Πu/∂pu = 0 give
pu− 12p
2








s − 2δp4u− 4p2spu− 4psp3u + 3p5u
)
= 0
The last two equations are a system of nonlinear equations for the prices of ps and pu that has to be treated
numerically for the optimum prices p∗s and p
∗











where cu = c+ δ. The first order conditions ∂Πs/∂ps = 0 and ∂Πu/∂pu = 0 gives the following system of
equations for the optimum prices
pu− 12p
2
u + c− 2ps = 0
3p3u + 2pspu− 2cu(2ps + p2u) = 0
Solving the first equation for ps and substituting into the second equation we arrive at a third degree
equation for the price of the PPU provider 5
2
p3u + (1− cu)p2u− (2cu− c)pu− 2ccu = 0. The cubic discriminant






, where p = β − 1
3





+ γ and where α = 2
5
(1− cu), β = − 25 (2cu − c), and
γ =− 4
5
ccu. The cubic discriminant ∆ depends on c and cu. It is straightforward to show numerically that
there are regions in (c, cu) space in which ∆> 0 and therefore there is only one real solution (0< pu < 1),
and regions where ∆ 6 0 and the cubic equation has three real solutions (one positive 0< pu < 1 and two
negatives). Therefore, for all values of c and cu there is one solution 0 < pu < 1, which implies also that
0< ps < 1 because ps has to satisfy pu− 12p
2
u + c− 2ps = 0.
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A.5. Uncertainty in the usage profile (Proof of proposition 4)
We assume that the maximum use frequency qm is a random variable q̃m that takes values qm − v with
probability 1
2
and qm + v with probability
1
2
where v > 0 is a measure of the uncertainty in the value of the
maximum use frequency.
A.5.1. Monopoly In the monopoly setting the seller will set a price ps and the profits she will expect
will become
Πs =
(ps− c)(qm + v− ps/a)
2(qm + v)
+







The price ps that maximizes the seller’s profits satisfies the equation ∂Πs/∂ps = 0. Comparing the seller’s
profits with the ones of the base model (A.1.1), we find the the seller behaves as if he is faced with a smaller
maximum frequency q′m = (q
2
m− v2)/qm 6 qm. Therefore, the optimum price and the expected profits under
uncertainty will be smaller than the ones of the base model for the monopolist seller. It can readily shown
that the optimum price p∗s and the maximum profits Π
∗









(aq′m− c)2 where q′m = (q2m− v2)/qm
If the monopolist chooses to sell uses of the product and offer a pay-per-use service at a price pu, he will
face per use cost c/(qm + v) + δ with probability
1
2
and c/(qm− v) + δ again with probability 12 . She will set




(pu− δ− c/(qm + v))(qm + v) +
1
4





Note that for the service provider, the effect of the uncertainty cancels out and the expression for the profits
is the same as in the base model in A.1.1. Therefore, the optimum price and the profits for the service
provider are exactly the same as in the base case. The seller on the other hand, faced with uncertainty, she
will choose a lower price than the price chosen in the base model. She will price as if the maximum use
frequency is q′m = (q
2
m− v2)/qm and of course, q′m 6 qm. This choice brings more market share than the base
model but less profits. Therefore, in monopoly the effect of uncertainty in the maximum use frequency qm
make the service provider more attractive than the seller.
A.5.2. Duopoly In duopoly, the indifferent customer is not affected by uncertainty in the maximum use
frequency qm and is, just like the base model, at q̄ = ps/pu. The expected profits as functions of the prices































































(qm + v)2(qm− v)2
]
(15)
Equation 14 can be written in the form (ps − c)(1 − ps/(q′mpu)) with q′m = qm − v2/qm. In other words,
the seller behaves as if the maximum use frequency is qm − v2/qm < qm. For example if v2 = 0.1qm then
the seller behaves as if the maximum frequency is 0.9qm. Similarly, equation 15 can be put in the form
1
2q′m







m = qm − v2/qm and c′ = c(1 + v2/q2m). In other words, the service
provider behaves as if she is facing a smaller maximum use frequency and a larger cost. Following the previous
example, if there is a 10% uncertainty in the maximum use frequency (i.e, v2 = 0.1qm), the service provider
will behave as if the maximum use frequency is 0.9qm and the cost is 1.1c.
The equilibrium (p∗s, p
∗
u) satisfies the equations ∂Πs/∂ps = 0 and ∂Πu/∂pu = 0. The equation ∂Πs/∂ps = 0










The service provider is constrained, as in the base case, by pu 6 a. The solution to the maximization problem









qm(a− 2δ)(q2m− v2)/(q2m + v2)
a for c > 1
2
qm(a− 2δ)(q2m− v2)/(q2m + v2)
(16)
Finally, substituting the optimum price of the service provider to the seller’s best response we find the








m− v2)) for c6 12qm(a− 2δ)(q
2





m− v2)) for c > 12qm(a− 2δ)(q
2
m− v2)/(q2m + v2)
(17)
The optimum profits can be computed by substituting the optimum prices from equations 16 and 17 to
the expressions for the profits 14 and 15.
A.6. Overcapacity and queuing effects
We assume that customer’s utility under the selling model is Us = qa− ps where a is the willingness to pay
for a single use and q is the desired usage. We also assume that customer’s utility under the PPU model is
Uu = q(A(ρ)− pu) where A(ρ) = ae−kρ/(1−ρ) for ρ ∈ [0,1]. The parameter ρ is a proxy for the service level
and is a decision variable for the PPU model. A(ρ) is the willingness to pay for a single use when the service
level is ρ. When ρ→ 0, A(ρ)→ a and when ρ→ 1, A(ρ)→ 0. Clearly A(ρ) 6 a. On the cost side we assume
also that the cost per use depends on the service level and is given by cu(ρ) = c/(ρqm)+ δ. Note that because
0 6 ρ6 1 we have that cu(ρ) > c/qm + δ i.e., the cost per use is greater than the strong pooling cost. The
PPU provider chooses first the service level ρ and subsequently the price pu.
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and the profits for the seller Πs and the PPU provider Πu are respectively













(c+ qm(a−A(ρ) + pu))
pu = a−A(ρ) + 2cu(ρ)
The PPU provider is constrained to have pu 6 A(ρ) because if he chooses a price more than customer’s
willingness to pay he will get no customers and no profits. Therefore there are two cases to consider: case
A where pu =A(ρ) which applies when cu(ρ)>A(ρ)− a/2 and case B where pu = a−A(ρ) + 2cu(ρ) which
applies when cu(ρ)6A(ρ)− a/2.
Case A: When pu =A(ρ) then ps =
1
2




that seller’s price and the indifferent customer do not depend on pu or ρ; the seller behaves as in the monopoly






































kc/(aqm) 6 0 which in turn limits the parameter kc to 0 6 kc6 4aqm/e2 ≈ 0.541aqm.
Case B: When pu = a−A(ρ) + 2cu(ρ) then set B(ρ) = a−A(ρ) + cu(ρ). The seller’s price is ps = 12 (c+
2qmB(ρ)) and the indifferent customer is at Q=
1
4














B′(ρ)(2qmB(ρ) + c)(2qmB(ρ)− c)
B2(ρ)
Where B′(ρ) = ∂B/∂ρ. Note that B(ρ) > 0 because a > A(ρ) and cu(ρ) > 0. Therefore, 2qmB(ρ) + c > 0.
Similarly, 2qmB(ρ)− c= 2qm(a−A(ρ)) + 2cρ − c > 0 because ρ ∈ [0,1]. Hence for ∂Πu/∂ρ= 0, we must have
B′(ρ) = 0 which gives us the same equation for ρ as in case A above.
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A.7. Service and price discrimination
A.7.1. Service Discrimination The PPU provider can decide to service the patient customers only,
leaving the impatient customers to the seller (Case A) or service the impatient customers only leaving the
patient segment to the seller.
Case A When customers are patient the PPU provider can schedule service in a way that demand in non
overlapping. In this case the cost per use is given by the strong pooling approximation as cu = c/qm + δ. The
PPU provider and the seller have to find prices pu and ps to maximize their profits. The profits of the seller








(w(ps− c)(qm− ps/pu) + (1−w)(ps− c)(qm− ps/a))










Case B The PPU provider has to find a price pu and a service level ρ and the seller has to find a price

















The problem for the PPU provider solves as in appendix (A.6). The optimum service level is ρ= z/(z− k)







. The optimum price is pu = a−A(ρ) + 2cu(ρ) for cu(ρ) 6 A(ρ)− a/2 and










A.7.2. Price Discrimination Assume that the PPU provider knows in which segment each customer
belongs and decides to offer two prices pu1 for the patient customers and pu2 for the impatient ones. Note
that for patient customers the PPU provider can schedule their demand and hence the cost per use is given
by the strong pooling approximation cu = c/qm + δ. For the impatient segment, the PPU provider has to























It is straight forward to show that pu1 = 2cu for cu 6 a/2 and pu1 = a for cu > a/2. The optimum ρ is







. The optimum price for the impatient segment is pu2 =
a−A(ρ) + 2cu(ρ) for cu(ρ) 6 A(ρ)− a/2 and pu2 = A(ρ) for cu(ρ) > A(ρ)− a/2, where A(ρ) = aekρ/(1−ρ).
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A.8. Proof of Lemma 1: The Generalized Lambert Function
Equations in the form xex = α are solved in terms of the Lambert W function, and the solution is given as
x=W (α). For more details on the properties of the Lambert W function see Corless et al. (1996). Equations
of the form
(x− t)ex = β(x− s) (18)
are solved through the generalized Lambert W function. The solution of (x− t)ex = β(x−s) is x=W(β; t, s).
For details and properties of the generalized Lambert W function see Siewert and Burniston (1974), Mező
(2017), and Wright (1961). For solving the equation (Ax+C) lnx−Bx= a we let y = lnx, or equivalently
x= ey. In terms of y the previous equation becomes (Ay−B)ey +Cy= a. We let z =Ay−B, or equivalently,
y = (z +B)/A. In terms of z the previous equation then becomes zez/AeB/A + C
A
(z +B) = a. Rearranging












It can be readily shown that the above equation for z/A is of the form of equation 18 with t = 0, β =









Carrying out the inverse transformations, the solution for x is then
x= exp
[
B
A
+W
(
−C
A
e−B/A; 0,
aA−BC
AC
)]
(19)
